Did you see the cyber warfare segment on CBS’s 60 Minutes? There’s an article, “Cyber War: Sabotaging the System” along with the video from the show, in case you missed it. CBS News correspondent Steve Kroft interviewed a host of people who are sure to know something about the country’s security – among them retired Admiral Michael McConnell and former State Department official Jim Lewis, who is currently director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, about the current state of cyber warfare.
Jim Lewis tells Steve Kroft how a series of major successful espionage attacks were perpetrated in 2007 against the Departments of Defense, State, and Commerce and probably the Department of Energy and NASA, resulting in the theft of terabytes of sensitive data. Lewis also mentioned a case in December 2008 in which attackers entered highly-secured classified Department of Defense networks, using seemingly discarded thumb drives containing malware. I had nightmares after this segment.
While the government can be expected to respond to these attacks by shoring up known holes and strengthening defenses, the basic question remains … “How come they didn’t detect the intruders immediately?” What we need to do, in both the public and private sectors, is to get much better at detecting anomalous behavior or even usual behavior that might have insidious elements.
We asked Warren Axelrod, a notable lecturer, practicioner and writer on information security how he would answer the question – “Warren, why didn’t they know?”
From the desk of Warren Axelrod: Pam, this news segment took my breath away as well. Let’s look at this for a moment. What we know is what security teams typically do is “close the barn door after the horse has fled”. As an example, we have seen how rogue USB devices can be used to infiltrate systems and networks. Consequently,we disable USB ports. Why wasn’t that done at the outset, since it is well known that viruses and malware are often resident on thumb drives? Unfortunately, sometimes we’re our own worst enemy.
When policies are created to disallow thumb drives, objections are often raised by powerful areas of influence – like the legal department. Their excuse is that they must respond immediately to requests for data. Similarly, the executive suite insists that they MIUST synchronize their whatever. Of course, after a breach, such arguments rapidly vaporize.
Nowyou might wonder why monitoring behavior on networks and systems include exceptions based on experiences after something bad has happened. Here’s a simple example: A criminal payables clerk accessed 400 hundred accounts per day when he/she was stealing information versus the usual twenty accounts per day. So someone gets the bright idea to report on anyone accessing more than 50 accounts per day. That makes sense if we’re just trying to avoid a recurrence of that type of breach.
But on closer inspection there are two problems here: one is that those with evil intentions soon learn how to stay below the radar and adjust their activities accordingly and two, we typically check for previously-experienced events. What about events that haven’t been seen before – that is the unknown unknowns?
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